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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
MURRAY CITY SC'HOOL 
DISTRICT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant-Appelant. 
Oase No. 
10060 
RE'PL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. c:::,·reJ . 
THE CASES AND STATUTES IBY.~tRE'S1PONDENT /~ ,p 
iN l'l£15 ·BRIEF ARE NOT DE'CI1SIVE OF THE QUES-
TION INVOLVED IN THIS A!CTION. 
Since the respondent has in its brief relied en-
tirely upon the Attorney General's opinion of March 
1~. 1962, the appellant thinks that it would be help-
fui to this Court to analyze the authorities cited 
therein. \Vhile that opinion cites many adjudicated 
ca~es in support of its conclusion, a close inspection 
of them will disclose that none of them are decisive 
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of the question involved in this case, viz. when a 
constitution or statute exempts a s·chool district 
from the payment of "taxes and local assessments" 
are sewer service charge included in that exemp-
tion? Some of the authorities cited in the Attorney 
General's opini·on in fact support the position of the 
a ppeUan t in this case that such charges are taxes 
or local assessments. 
Respondent first cites se'C. 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1'953 
and argues that the Legislature in enacting that 
section must have intended that sewer improvement 
districts could enter into contracts with school dis-
tricts and charge them sewer service charges. That 
section provides, so far as is pertinent here: 
" (c) [Each sewer improvement district shall 
have] the power to enter in to such contracts 
as are considered desi~able by the board to 
carry out the functions of the district, includ-
ing specifica]ly the power to enter into con-
tracts with municipal corporations, or other 
public corporations, or districts, and any coun-
ty, any municipal corporation, or any other 
public corporation or districts, shall have the 
power to enter into contracts with districts 
created under this act for the purpose of 
constructing, acquiring or operating all or any 
part of a system for the collection, treatm~nt 
and disposition of sewage; * * * (Itahcs 
added) 
In the first place, that section deals with powers 
of sewer improvement districts, and not with the 
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powers of a second class city such as the plaintifl 
in this action. Nothing contained therein can in any 
way enlarge the powers of Murray City in this 
action. Secondly, the above section does not speci-
fically mention school districts. It does not provide, 
as respondent seems to argue, that sewer districts 
can contract with school districts. It merely gives 
sewer districts the right to contract with other 
sewer districts or other improvement distri'cts or 
with municipal corporations such as a city or town, 
and it allows the two contracting parties ~to jointly 
construct, acquire or operate sewer systems. Sec. 
17-6-3.8 was not intende'd to enlarge the powers of 
school districts and put them in the business of own-
ing and operating sewer systems. It clearly has no 
application to school districts, but only to those 
improvement districts and corporations which have 
preYi'ously been given by the Legislature power to 
construct and operate sewer systems. It would allow 
a city or town to contract with a sewer improvement 
district and jointly operate such a system. 
Thirdly, sec. 17-6-3.6 relating to the powers of 
sewer improvement districts provides that in case 
a user of the system does not pay his sewer charges, 
they shall be : 
"certified by the clerk of the district to the 
treasurer or assessor o'f the county in which 
the delinquent premies are located, in whi'ch 
case such delinquent charges, together with 
interest and penalties, shall immediately upon 
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such certification, become a lien on the de-
linquent premises on a parity with and col-
lectible at the same time and in the Siame man-
ner as general county taxes are a lien on such 
premises and are cdllectible. All methods of 
enforcement available for the cdllection of such 
ge~eral county taxes, including sale of the 
delinquent premises, shall be available and 
shall be used in the collection of the delinquent 
sewer charges." 
This statute clearly denominates sewer charges 
as taxes since, when unpaid, they can become a l'ien 
against the property served. One of the tests in' de-
termining whether a certain charge is :a 'l'tax" or 
not, is whether it can become a lien against 
property. If it can become a lien, it is in fact a 
"tax". Furthermore, if the respondent is correct in 
its argument that a school distri~t must pay service 
charges to a sewer improvement district, then it 
would seem that under sec. 17-6-3.6 the school pro-
perty could be liened and sold if the district became 
delinquent. Such a conclusion flies in the face of 
sec. 53-4-1'2, U.C.A. 195'3 which prohibits school 
,property from being taken in any manner for debt. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the only reason-
able conclusion to be reached regarding sewer im-
provement districts is that they do not have powee 
to contract with school districts and do not have 
the power to impose their service charges upon them. 
Respondent quotes from and cites with ap-
proval sec. 1805, 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, 
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pg. 27~. Appellant submits that this authority actu-
ally supports its position because the text of that 
section was taken from the holding in In re Pet-i-
tion of the City of Philadelphia, 340 Pa. 17, 16 A. 
~d :)~, which is cited and discussed at lengfu in ap-
pellant's main brief. The rule of that case is that 
whel·e an ordinance requires all property owners 
within a certain distance of the system to pay serv-
ice charges, whether connected or not, the charge is 
in fact a tax. Such is the case here since Murray 
City's ordinance #56 (R. 6) requires all property 
owners within 200 feet to pay, whether connected 
or not, and irrespective of the use made. 
\Ve have no quarrel with the cases cited by re-
spondent. Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 
·1~. 256 P. 2d 515, did not involve the questlon of 
exemption from payment of the sewer charges. It 
Y:as concerned only with whether in a revenue bond 
election, the general laws governing municipal e'lec-
tions applied with regards to the giving of. notice 
of election and qualification of voters, or whether 
the laws governing general obligation bon'd elec-
tions applied. The court simply held fuat the general 
municipal election laws applied. 
In Town of Port Orchard v. Kitsop County, 19 
\Yashington 2d 59, 141 P. 2d 15'1, no question of 
exemption fron1 "tax" was raised. There was no 
contention made that the county did not have to 
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pay. The only question was the reasonableness of 
the charge imposed. 
Grim v. Village of Lewisville, 54 Ohio App. 
270, 6 N.E. 2d 998, was a suit by a private person 
and did not involve the exemption of a school dis-
trict or other public body from the payment of 
sewer charges. 
Louisville v. Joseph Seagrams, 307 Ky. 413,211 
S. W. 2d 12'2, involved only fue question of "uni-
formity of taxation". No question of exemption by 
a pubHc bddy was asserted or raised or discussed. 
In Louisville v. Barker, County Judge, 307 Ky. 
6515, 212 S.W. 2d 12'2, there was no constitutional 
or statutory exemption raised. The plaintiff who 
was claiming an exemption relied solely upon the 
general prin'ciple that one governmental agency can-
not impose burdens on another in the absence of a 
positively expressed right. The court simply held 
that this principle was insufficient to establish an 
exemption, and that the Legislature had not by sta-
tute exempted counties from payment of service 
charges. There was not in that case, like there is in 
our case, any express constitutional or statutory 
exemption wh'ich the county could rely upon. The 
case is further distinguishable because there the 
charges could be used solely for the maintenance and 
operation of the system. In the case now before this 
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court, Murray City can and has put surplus amounts 
in its general fund as it does other taxes collected 
by it. 
In Sanitation District No. 1 of Jefferson Coun-
ty v. Campbell, Kentucky, 249 S.W. 2d 767, the only 
question was whether a statute was constitutional 
which compelled abutting property owners to con-
nect to public sewer systems where they were dis-
posing of their sewage through septic tanks ori-
ginally installed in accordance with sta:te health 
regulations. The court held the statute constitution-
al. No question of exemption was raised or dis-
cussed. 
In Veail v. Louisville, ,et al., 303 Ky. 248, 197 
S.\V. 2d 413, no question of exemption was raised. 
The only question involved "doub'le taxation" and 
the court held that sewer charges were not taxes 
within the meaning of the rule 1a;gainst double tax-
ation. 
State v. Taylor, 149 Ohio S. 427, 79 N.E. 2d 
127, did not involve an exemption from the payment 
of sewer charges. It involved only the in terpre'ta-
tion of a contract between the city and the univer-
sity. It was not contended that the university had 
any constitutional or statutory exemption. 
In Repperger v. City of Grand Rapids, 338 
:\lich. 682, 62 N.W. 2d 585, the plaintiff contended 
that sewer charges should be collected by assess-
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n1ent against the property served or by personal 
action against the consumer, and should not be col-
lected by shutting off his water. No question of ex-
emption was raised. 
In Oliver v. Water Works and Sanitary Sewer· 
Board, 261 Alabama 234, 73 So. 2d 552, no question 
of exemption was raised. The only matter decided 
was that sewer charges were not taxes within the 
meaning of a constitutional provision prohibiting 
the delegation of the power to tax. 
In Patterson v. City of Chattanoogas 1912 Tenn. 
267, 24~ S.W. 2d 2'9'1, no question of exemption was 
raised. The. court. heT4 that sewer charges were not 
taxes within the meaning of a constitutional pro-
vision requiring taxes to he based upon the valua-
tion of the property. 
Laverents v. Cheyenne, 67 Wyoming 1'87, 217 
Pd. 877, held that sewer charges were not taxes 
and did not create an indebtedness within the mean-
ing of a constitutional debt limit provision. No 
question of exemption was ever raised. 
Michelson v. City of Grand Island, 154 Neb~ 
~aska 654, 48 N.W. 2d 769, held that sewer charges 
were not special assessments for a general improve~ 
ment within the meaning of a constitutional pro-
hibition. Again, no question of exemption was raised, 
argued or discussed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondent's authorities really are not de-
cisive of the question involved in this lawsuit. The 
McGonagle case decided by this court in 1910 is the 
only case directly in point and it bears out the posi-
tion of the appellant that a s~hool district of the 
State of Utah is exempt from the payment of sewer 
connection or service charges. 
Respectfu'lly submitted, 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
5055 South State St. 
Murray, Uta;h 
Attorney for Appellant 
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